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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 16-1321 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
         
v. 
  
MYKAL DERRY, a/k/a/ Koose,  
a/k/a Leenie, a/k/a Cannon, a/k/a Moose 
 
Mykal Derry, 
Appellant 
 
________________ 
 
No. 16-3489 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
         
v. 
 
MALIK DERRY, 
a/k/a Leek, a/k/a Lik,a/k/a Mykell Watson 
 
Malik Derry, 
Appellant 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. Nos. 1-14-cr-00050-001 & 1-14-cr-00050-005) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 11, 2018 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
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(Opinion filed: June 22, 2018) 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Appellants Mykal and Malik Derry, step-brothers, were convicted of conspiracy to 
distribute one or more kilograms of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
841(b)(1)(A), 846, and 860, discharging a firearm in furtherance of that conspiracy, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), and multiple counts of using a telephone to 
facilitate drug trafficking, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). Mykal was also convicted 
of distributing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and operating 
a drug stash house, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856. Nineteen defendants were charged as 
part of this conspiracy. Thirteen pled guilty and the remaining defendants were separated 
into two trials. We affirmed four defendants’ convictions in the first trial, see United 
States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2016), and we now review Mykal and Malik’s 
convictions and sentences in the second trial. They contest mainly their convictions for 
discharging a firearm in furtherance of the drug conspiracy, and focus in particular on the 
District Court’s decision to admit evidence tying them to the shooting death of Tyquinn 
James. In doing so, they argue the District Court made a number of errors warranting 
vacation of their convictions or remand for re-sentencing. We address each argument in 
turn. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. Admission of Non-Video Evidence of the James Murder 
Mykal contests the District Court’s decision to admit non-video evidence of the 
James murder, arguing it was cumulative and unfairly prejudicial to him. We review the 
Court’s decision to admit the evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Schneider, 
801 F.3d 186, 197 (3d Cir. 2015). Mykal claims the evidence was cumulative because the 
Government had already introduced plenty of evidence that supported using a firearm in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. However, none of the evidence items he recounts go to 
discharge of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy; rather, they show possession or 
use. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Mykal does not tell us why the evidence was 
unfairly prejudicial. Hence we echo our opinion in Bailey—that the high probative value 
of the non-video evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 840 F.3d 
at 118–20. 
II. Admission of Video Evidence of the James Murder 
We likewise look to Bailey to determine whether the District Court erred by 
admitting video evidence of the James murder. First, we note the Government concedes 
the District Court erred by admitting the video under the “law of the case” doctrine rather 
than by undertaking the balancing test prescribed by Federal Rule of Evidence 403.1 We 
                                              
1 Malik argues the Court’s misapplication of the “law of the case” doctrine denied him 
procedural due process because he was not present in the first trial to contest that court’s 
admission of the video evidence. Our case law does not support the claim that this 
resulted in constitutional harm. Moreover, Malik had access to procedures available in his 
own trial to contest the video’s admission, which he did. We see no denial of procedural 
due process here. 
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may affirm despite this error, however, either if the video would have been admissible 
under the proper test or if its admission was harmless. 
Both Mykal and Malik argue the video should not have been admitted under the 
balancing test because it was highly prejudicial and lacked probative value in light of the 
availability and admission of non-video evidence of the murder. We follow our analysis 
and holding in Bailey on the balancing test: the video lacked probative value because of 
the availability of abundant non-video evidence and its graphic nature made it highly 
prejudicial. 840 F.3d at 121–24. Thus, for the reasons expressed in Bailey, the District 
Court should not have admitted the video evidence. Id. 
We review separately whether this error was harmless, i.e., if “it is highly probable 
that the error did not contribute to the judgment.” United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 
1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). “High 
probability” requires us to “possess a sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 
defendant.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). Malik asserts that 
the error here was not harmless because the jury chose to review the video multiple times 
and relied on it to acquit him of brandishing a firearm. He believes this also signals that 
jurors relied on the video to convict him of discharging a firearm in furtherance of the 
drug conspiracy. 
First, Malik’s acquittal of a charge based on the jury’s review of the video no 
doubt did not prejudice him. Second, it is highly probable the video evidence did not 
contribute to either defendant’s conviction for discharging a firearm in furtherance of a 
drug conspiracy in light of the substantial non-video evidence that supported that 
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conviction. Mykal and Malik’s intercepted conversation in which Mykal instructs Malik 
to murder James, as well as evidence of other co-conspirators’ prior failed attempts to 
murder him, are particularly compelling. Hence admission of the video in these 
circumstances was harmless.2 
III. Suppression of Witness Statements 
Malik contends the District Court erred by denying his motion under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and holding the Government did not violate due process 
by withholding three witness statements. We review de novo the Court’s conclusions of 
law and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 969 
(3d Cir. 1991).  
On appeal, Malik challenges the Court’s factual findings of each witness’s role in 
the conspiracy and knowledge base. He claims the Court’s reliance on these erroneous 
factual findings led to legal error in holding there was no Brady violation. We cannot say 
the District Court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous; the Court laid out myriad 
reasons to support its conclusion that each witness’s role was circumscribed and none 
would not have knowledge of Malik or Mykal’s violent acts. Moreover, each witness 
stated he or she did not know of the reason for the James murder.  
Malik’s claim of legal error is similarly unavailing. Under Brady the Government 
violates due process if it suppresses evidence favorable to an accused that is material to 
either guilt or punishment. 373 U.S. at 87. Evidence is favorable if it is either exculpatory 
                                              
2 We reiterate our admonition in Bailey that “the doctrine of harmless error is not a 
license to engage in whatever prejudicial practices an attorney might feel he or she can 
get away with because the harmless error analysis will inoculate the end result against 
reversal on appeal.” 840 F.3d at 124. 
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or impeaching, and it is material if there is a reasonable probability that its disclosure 
would have led to a different result in the proceeding. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 
280–81 (1999). We agree with the District Court’s thorough and well-reasoned holding, 
and we adopt its reasoning as our own, that the statements were not favorable and were 
not material.3 Contrary to Malik’s assertion, the witnesses’ lack of knowledge was not 
itself favorable evidence; even if they had extensive knowledge of the conspiracy’s inner 
workings in general, that does not overcome the Court’s finding that none would have 
had knowledge of violent acts committed by Malik or Mykal. Finally, given the strength 
of the Government’s case that James was murdered in furtherance of the charged 
conspiracy, neither individually nor cumulatively would the statements’ admission have 
been reasonably likely to change the trial outcome. 
IV. Mark Frye’s Fifth Amendment Privilege 
Mykal argues the District Court committed reversible error by finding Mark Frye 
(a heroin dealer who supplied Mykal) did not waive his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination because Frye answered a question by defense counsel before 
claiming the privilege. We review this claim of legal error de novo, United States v. 
Chabot, 793 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2015), but accept the Court’s factual findings unless 
they are clearly erroneous, United States v. Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 
759 (7th Cir. 1999). 
The Court found that Frye was confused about when to assert the privilege, and, 
due to his confusion, he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive it when he answered 
                                              
3 We affirm on these grounds and thus do not address the Government’s argument that 
Jodi Brown’s statement was not suppressed. 
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defense counsel’s question. His counsel failed timely to question him about his 
understanding of the privilege, and the Court did not remedy that error by asking those 
questions itself. Further, when his counsel subsequently asked the proper foundation 
questions, Frye immediately asserted the privilege in response to defense counsel’s 
question. 
We do not disturb the Court’s factual finding that Frye was confused. The 
transcript of his testimony shows that he intended to assert his Fifth Amendment 
privilege but was unsure of when to do so. The Court’s legal conclusion, however, 
presumes confusion about when to assert one’s privilege precludes finding the privilege 
waived. Of course, waiver of a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 
(1987). But today we need not resolve the question of whether confusion about when to 
assert one’s Fifth Amendment privilege renders a subsequent waiver involuntary or 
unknowing.  
Even assuming the District Court erred by reaching this legal conclusion, any error 
was harmless. Mykal does not explain what evidence or information he would have 
derived from Frye’s testimony. Based on our review of the record, Frye’s testimony 
likely would have pertained to the drug conspiracy charge and not the firearm offense. 
Mykal subpoenaed Frye to contradict another witness’s testimony corroborating wiretap 
and surveillance evidence of Mykal’s heroin purchases. Even if Frye’s testimony would 
have made that witness’s testimony incredible, the jury still had considerable evidence—
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particularly from the wiretaps and Mykal’s admissions—to convict him of the conspiracy 
charge. 
V. Mykal’s Sentencing 
Mykal argues the Court at sentencing erred by applying the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(d)(1) cross-reference4 based on the James murder, 
thereby increasing his base offense level to 43 and suggested minimum sentence to life 
imprisonment. He contends the Government did not show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the murder was committed in furtherance of the drug conspiracy. He further 
argues the Court’s application of the cross-reference violated the Sixth Amendment 
because the issue of whether the murder was “in furtherance of” the conspiracy was not 
submitted to the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt. He cites to Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), for the proposition that “any fact that increases the mandatory 
minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 102. We review for 
clear error the Court’s factual findings in applying the Sentencing Guidelines. United 
States v. Knight, 700 F.3d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 2012). Mykal’s Sixth Amendment claim gets de 
novo review. United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 671 (3d Cir. 2012). 
                                              
4 This provision states:  
 
[I]f a victim was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 
U.S.C. § 1111 had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime 
jurisdiction of the United States, apply § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder) or § 2A1.2 
(Second Degree Murder), as appropriate, if the resulting offense level is greater 
than that determined under this guideline. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(d)(1). 
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The Court at sentencing had to find “that murder was . . . in furtherance of the 
drug-related conspiracy.” United States v. Gamez, 301 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2002). 
And it did, as it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the James murder was in 
furtherance of the drug trafficking conspiracy. Given the abundance of evidence the 
Court recounted in support of its finding, we cannot say it clearly erred by finding that 
the murder was “in furtherance of” the conspiracy. 
Neither did the Court violate the Sixth Amendment by not submitting to the jury 
the question of whether the murder was in furtherance of the conspiracy. Contrary to 
Mykal’s suggestion, “Alleyne did not curtail a sentencing court’s ability to find facts 
relevant in selecting a sentence within the prescribed statutory range.” United States v. 
Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (emphasis omitted). That is what the Court did 
here—it found a fact to determine the advisory (i.e., not mandatory) Guidelines range for 
Mykal’s sentence within the statutorily prescribed range. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 
* * * * * 
In sum, we hold the District Court did not err by admitting the non-video evidence 
of the James murder, and its error in admitting the video evidence of that murder was 
harmless. Neither did it err by holding the suppression of certain witness statements did 
not violate Brady. We do not decide whether the Court erred by finding Frye did not 
waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but even assuming it 
did, any error was harmless. Finally, we hold the Court at sentencing properly applied the 
cross-reference based on the James murder.  We thus affirm. 
